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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, courts have confirmed several Chapter 11 
bankruptcy plans that provided for the sale of a secured creditor’s 
collateral while expressly denying the secured creditor the right 
to credit bid at the sale. (Credit bidding is the ability of a secured 
creditor to purchase its collateral at auction by crediting the pur-
chase price against the secured debt rather than paying cash. After 
all, if it paid cash, that cash would just be returned to the secured 
creditor as payment on its secured claim.) Debtors argue that the 
presence of a secured creditor who can credit bid discourages third 
parties from participating in the auction; creditors believe that the 
denial of their right to credit bid is an attempt to force them to take 
less than the full value of the collateral—in many cases through a 
low bid submitted by a purchaser related to or favored by the debtor. 
This case could be decided on narrow grounds of statutory interpre-
tation, or be the occasion for serious consideration of the premises 
of bankruptcy law, mortgage law, and secured credit.
ISSUE
May a debtor confirm a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization under 
which it sells assets free of a lien without providing the secured 
creditor with the right to credit bid as specified in 11 U.S.C.  
§ 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii), instead of providing the secured creditor with 
the proceeds of the sale as the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim 
under 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii)? 
FACTS
The debtors, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC, and RadLAX Gateway 
Deck, LLC, own the Radisson Hotel and a neighboring parking  
structure at the Los Angeles International Airport. In 2007, they 
obtained a $142 million construction loan from the lender, Ultra 
Construction Loan Investment Fund (for whom Amalgamated 
Bank serves as trustee and administrative agent). In 2008, the 
debtors defaulted on the loan, which then stood at $120 million 
and was secured by substantially all of the debtors’ assets. During 
the bankruptcy case, the debtors arranged a sale of the assets for 
$47.5 million to a buyer linked to the debtors. The principal behind 
the debtors had an option to purchase equity in the purchaser, and 
the purchaser agreed to retain the existing management com-
pany, owned by the principal, if it acquired the project.  The sale 
terms provided that the proceeds would be used to pay the debtors’ 
financial advisers’ fees and that the purchaser would provide a small 
share of profits for three years to fund some distribution to unse-
cured creditors. The remaining sale proceeds would go to the lender 
as payment on its construction loan.
The sale would be subject to higher offers at an open auction, but 
the contract with the buyer provided that the lender would not be 
permitted to credit bid. The debtors filed a plan of reorganization to 
conduct this auction and sale and then distribute the proceeds.  
The lender objected, contending that the plan could not be confirmed 
because the lender had a right to credit bid at any sale of its collater-
al. The bankruptcy court agreed and held that the plan could not be 
confirmed. However, in light of two recent court of appeals decisions 
that had permitted similar plans (In re Philadelphia Newspapers, 
LLC, 599 F.3d 298 (3d Cir. 2010) and In re Pacific Lumber Co., 584 
F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2009)), the bankruptcy court certified an immedi-
ate appeal to the Seventh Circuit. While the appeal was pending, 
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CASE AT A GLANCE 
A bankruptcy plan can only be confirmed over the objection of a secured creditor if the plan is found to be 
“fair and equitable.” The fair and equitable standard requires, at a minimum, that (i) the creditor may retain 
its lien on its collateral; (ii) the collateral will be sold subject to the creditor’s right to credit bid its debt; 
or (iii) the creditor will receive the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim. The Supreme Court must decide 
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equivalent” of its claim, under (iii). 
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the lender moved for relief from the automatic stay so that it could 
foreclose on the project. Meanwhile, the purchaser increased its 
offer for the property to $55 million.  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision not to 
confirm the plan. It held that while the statutory provision at issue, 
§ 1129(b)(2)(A), was not unambiguous, the better reading was that 
in any sale of collateral free and clear of liens the credit bidding 
rights of subdivision (ii) had to be applied, and the debtor could not 
avoid them by relying on subdivision (iii)’s alternative of providing 
the “indubitable equivalent” of the creditor’s claim.  
CASE ANALYSIS
A plan of reorganization can be confirmed if all classes of creditors 
consent to the plan, or can be confirmed over the objection of a class 
of creditors if certain requirements are met. One such requirement 
is that the plan be “fair and equitable” to any dissenting class of 
creditors. The Bankruptcy Code then provides that 
(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a 
plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes 
the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan 
provides—
(i) (I) that the holders of such claims retain the 
liens securing such claims, whether the property 
subject to such liens is retained by the debtor or 
transferred to another entity, to the extent of the 
allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class 
receive on account of such claim deferred cash 
payments totaling at least the allowed amount of 
such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of 
the plan, of at least the value of such holder’s inter-
est in the estate’s interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this 
title, of any property that is subject to the liens 
securing such claims, free and clear of such liens, 
with such liens to attach to the proceeds of such 
sale, and the treatment of such liens on proceeds 
under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indu-
bitable equivalent of such claims.
The debtors contend that because (i), (ii), and (iii) are joined by 
the word “or,” the plan can be confirmed if any of them are met, 
and their plan satisfies the “indubitable equivalent” requirement of 
(iii). The lender contends, however, that while these are alterna-
tives, the debtor must satisfy the applicable alternative, and that in 
any case where the property is being sold free and clear of liens, the 
applicable alternative is (ii). In turn, subdivision (ii) requires that 
the sale be “subject to section 363(k),” which provides that a credi-
tor may credit bid with its debt if its collateral is sold.  
Each side supports its claim with various canons of statutory con-
struction. The debtors argue “or” is disjunctive, meaning that any 
of the three standards, alone, meets the requirement. Moreover, by 
saying that the plan must provide for one of these, the statute leaves 
it up to the plan proponent to decide which to satisfy. According 
to the debtors, the text of the statute is clear and unambiguous in 
saying that any of these alternatives can be used to meet the fair 
and equitable standard. This, the debtors argue, is consistent with 
the goal of promoting reorganization by permitting flexibility in plan 
drafting rather than requiring a single approach to protecting the 
rights of the secured creditor. Further, the debtors point out, the sale 
procedures do not prevent the secured creditor from bidding—they 
simply require that the secured creditor bid cash, just as any other 
bidder must. If the secured creditor wins the auction, the creditor 
will then receive its cash back in satisfaction of its claim. 
The lender argues that the debtors’ construction of the statute 
would allow subdivision (iii) to achieve an “end-run around the 
more specific, and more stringent, protections of clause (ii).” Ac-
cording to the lender, the debtors here are attempting to do precisely 
what is contemplated by subdivision (ii) (a sale free and clear of 
liens) without providing the protection specifically required by that 
subdivision (credit bidding).  
The heart of the lender’s argument, however, is not about how stat-
utes should be read but about the overall scheme of the Bankruptcy 
Code in dealing with the rights of secured creditors. According to 
the lender, the code has been carefully designed to protect secured 
creditors from the undervaluation of their collateral. This is accom-
plished by numerous interrelated provisions that include the right 
to credit bid under § 363(k) if the property is to be sold free and 
clear of liens, and the right to retain its lien for the full amount of 
the debt if the collateral is otherwise retained by the debtor or trans-
ferred. According to the lender, the debtor’s reading of § 1129 to 
permit a lender to be stripped of its lien exchange for the proceeds 
of sale, without the ability to credit bid, allows the court to compel 
the lender to accept less than the full value of its lien in violation 
of these carefully drawn protections. In particular, the lender notes 
that bankruptcy sales often do not result in full value being realized 
and that bankruptcy sale processes are susceptible to manipulation 
by the debtor to sell collateral for less than full value to a favored 
bidder (as in this case). According to the lender, the right to credit 
bid is the ultimate protection against this risk, and the ability to bid 
cash is not a satisfactory alternative because not all creditors can 
raise the cash, and those who can will incur substantial, and unnec-
essary, costs in doing so. (In its brief as amicus curiae, the United 
States points out that the government is a major secured creditor 
that is generally not able to bid in cash, so depriving it of the right 
to credit bid would preclude its participation in any auction.)
The debtors, in contrast, focus on the need of bankruptcy debtors for 
flexibility in designing a plan of reorganization that will preserve 
the company’s value and the jobs of its employees. In their reading, 
the right to credit bid is not the only possible way to protect the 
rights of secured creditors; clause (iii), by guaranteeing a secured 
creditor the “indubitable equivalent” of its claim, satisfies any 
concerns about undervaluation of the secured claim. A restrictive 
reading of § 1129 is thus unnecessary, the debtors conclude, and 
inconsistent with the rehabilitative goals of the Bankruptcy Code.  
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SIGNIFICANCE
This case is being closely watched by bankruptcy practitioners 
because the right to credit bid is viewed by creditors as a fundamen-
tal protection of their economic interests against undervaluation by 
the courts and manipulation by borrowers. (The problem of skewing 
the sale process to favor an insider is obvious here and was perhaps 
even more blatant in the Philadelphia Newspaper case that the 
Third Circuit decided.) From the debtor’s perspective, however, the 
creditor’s ability to credit bid is an often insuperable barrier to sale 
or reorganization of the assets.   
This case is in some ways less than ideal as a vehicle for resolving 
these issues because it is a single asset real estate case, rather 
than some more complex operating company. In bankruptcy cases 
of many operating companies, the outcome of the bankruptcy 
case determines if the company will continue in business, to the 
benefit of its employees, suppliers, and community. With single 
asset real estate, however, there is no question about these issues; 
the only question is who the owner of the asset will be. In the end, 
this particular case is more of a fight between the lender and the 
debtors’ principal over the value of the asset rather than an attempt 
to “reorganize” a company. Moreover, in RadLAX, all of the debtors’ 
assets have been pledged to one secured creditor. In other cases—
where a secured creditor has a lien on a critical piece of equipment 
or property but there are also other secured creditors with liens on 
other assets, and perhaps assets that are unpledged and so available 
to fund a payout to unsecured creditors—the balance between the 
need to protect a secured creditor’s rights and the need for flexibil-
ity in structuring a reorganization might appear very different.   
Marshall Tracht is a professor of bankruptcy and real estate law at 
New York Law School and director of the school’s Real Estate LL.M. 
Program. He can be reached at mtracht@nyls.edu or 212.431.2139.
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